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Walmart’s Sustainability Journey: Defining Sustainable Products (B) 
During the July 2009 Sustainability Milestone Meeting, Walmart CEO Mike Duke announced 
that Walmart would be taking the lead in developing a multistakeholder consortium, which in 
turn would design and implement a public standard for product sustainability. He justified the 
announcement by noting, 
Despite all the work that’s been done, we see only bits of information, but not the 
full picture across the supply chain. We don’t know the patterns, hidden costs, and 
impacts of the products we make and sell. Nor do we have a single source of data 
or a common standard for evaluating the sustainability of products. If we want to 
help the customer of the future live better, we need that data. We need that big 
picture view. So today, we’re announcing that we will lead the creation of a 
Sustainability Index. The Index will bring about a more transparent supply chain, 
drive product innovation and, ultimately, provide consumers the information they 
need to assess the sustainability of products.
i
 
To develop the index, Walmart would help organize a “consortium of universities that will 
collaborate with suppliers, retailers, nongovernmental organizations, and government to develop 
a global database of information on the lifecycle of products … from raw materials to disposal.” 
Then Duke announced that he would provide a lead gift of $2 million to establish The 
Sustainability Consortium, a contribution that would rise to $6 million by 2012. 
Despite Walmart’s leading role in the consortium, Duke was clear that the ultimate goal was to 
develop a collective standard that could be used by multiple firms in reference to multiple 
products: 
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It is not our goal to create or own this index; we want to spur the development of 
a common database that will allow the consortium to collect and analyze the 
knowledge of the global supply chain. We think this shared database will generate 




Once the lifecycle-based database had been created, Duke hoped it would serve as the basis by 
which suppliers communicated the sustainability of their products, in a standardized, comparable 
manner. In turn, buyers at Walmart could better evaluate the sustainability of the products they 
procured. Such capabilities would support progress on the third sustainability commitment the 
company had made in 2005, namely, to sell sustainable products. He also anticipated that a 
related simple tool could help consumers understand the environmental impacts of items they 
were purchasing.  
But it turned out that developing an index that communicated to consumers, already confused by 
the plethora of sustainability labels, would be far more complicated than Duke anticipated.
iii
  
The Sustainability Consortium 
Almost three years after Duke’s announcement, The Sustainability Consortium (TSC) had grown 
to include more than 90 members from business (representing at least $1.5 trillion in revenue), 
government, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Consortium’s stated mission was 
“to design and implement credible, transparent, and scalable science-based measurement and 
reporting systems accessible for all producers, retailers, and users of consumer products.”
iv
 (See 
Exhibit 1 for a listing of some TSC members as shown on the TSC Web.) Until the board of 
directors was named in January 2011, the Consortium had been guided by its academic 
codirectors, Jon Johnson of the University of Arkansas and Kevin Dooley of Arizona State 
University (Dooley followed Jay Golden of Arizona State University, who took a position at 
Duke University in August 2010). Johnson served as the chair of the board, which also included 
five corporate seats, four university seats, and two NGO seats. The five corporate members were 
elected from TSC’s general membership and included Andrea Thomas, Senior Vice President for 
Sustainability at Walmart. Thomas was the third person to lead Walmart’s sustainability efforts, 
after replacing her predecessor Matt Kistler in September 2010. 
For businesses, TSC membership structure featured two tiers at its inception. Tier 1 membership 
cost $100,000 and Tier 2 cost $50,000, though smaller firms received reduced rates. With Tier 1 
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membership, firms attained select benefits, including participation in governance and access to 
Consortium-wide working groups (see Exhibit 2). Although Walmart remained the largest 
contributor, and many firms joined mainly in response to Walmart’s participation, TSC’s formal 
governance did not provide Walmart with any special role. Instead, Walmart was just one of the 
many companies responsible for figuring out how to collaborate and develop a system that could 
provide a rating score for any product’s environmental impact.  
To implement its strategy, the Consortium organized sector-specific and consortium-wide 
working groups. The latter (i.e., Consumer Science, IT Standards & Tools, and Measurement 
Science) aimed to address common issues, such as how to measure and what tools to use. The 
sector-specific groups (Retail; Paper; Home and Personal Care; Electronics; Packaging; Food, 
Beverage, and Agriculture; Clothing, Footwear, and Textiles; and Toys) instead examined 
sustainability issues at different levels of aggregation, such as major product categories, and thus 
worked to determine what should be measured. Overall, TSC aimed to develop sustainability 
metrics at the product category level, defined as groups of products that share similar attributes 
and functions, such as the cereal category, laundry detergent category, toy category, novel 




Seeking Common Standards 
An early challenge for TSC was managing public and private interests related to the development 
of common environmental standards. Jon Johnson, the codirector, believed that member firms 
shared a common interest in working together to address “pre-competitive” issues that would 
enable the market for sustainable products to work more effectively: 
In a pre-competitive space, companies can create conditions under which they can 
later compete more effectively and efficiently. Information is the raw material of 
markets, and truly efficient markets require perfect information, but the 
information they have is imperfect. If firms can collaborate in a pre-competitive 
way to create better information with fewer information asymmetries, more 
credibility, more certainty, and most importantly, more harmonization so that 
everyone is speaking the same language, then they can later interact more 
effectively in a competitive market, because they’re exchanging better 
information, and doing so more efficiently. Developing standards is a perfect 
example because companies should protect proprietary information but release the 
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Thus, the Consortium strived to accelerate the market for sustainable products by providing 
member companies with information that they could use to better understand, share, 
differentiate, and declare the environmental impact of their products.  
Despite the common goal of addressing “pre-competitive” issues in market development, many 
firms considered the creation of any reporting label or scorecard as a competitive issue that 
should, at least at first, be left to individual members, rather than decided on as a whole. The 
development of an algorithm to evaluate the trade-offs among multiple dimensions of product 
sustainability (e.g., carbon, water, energy, waste) raised competitive concerns. What dimensions 
would be included? How should they be measured, weighted, and reported? Who gets to arbitrate 
if firms disagree about what the standards should be? For some firms, the failure to create any 
standards offered a better outcome than developing a standard that might harm their product 
sales or marketing. 
To balance public and private interests and address such questions, Johnson recognized that TSC 
could not own or operate a proprietary sustainability index: 
There is a fundamental difference between a system containing data sufficient to 
create a label and the label itself. That is to say, different stakeholders could 
create different labels from the same data system. Those differences would result 
from the different political, competitive, moral, social, and cultural beliefs 
emphasized by those groups. For instance, social dimensions such as working 
conditions might be important for one group but not another. Those kinds of 
judgments are just not within the purview or even expertise of the Consortium. 
Our work should be focused on building a science-based platform that these 
parties can use in their assessments of product sustainability, no matter what lens 
they choose.  
The Consortium therefore aimed to separate itself from Walmart’s, or any other individual 
company’s, preferences and develop a comprehensive index that could directly evaluate a 
company’s product sustainability claims. As Johnson remarked at the time, “The Walmart 
Supplier Sustainability Assessment Tool is really not directly relevant or related to what we're 
doing. What we're doing is creating a system that would enable companies to get information on 
product categories or products. It’s not at the company level.”
vii
 Thus, TSC members would 
develop a scientific platform, and consumer products companies would use it to assess the 
environmental impacts over any particular product lifecycle. Helping companies lower their 
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environmental impact did not mean that the Consortium would participate in any product design 
or comparative product ranking among competitors. 
Sustainability Measurement and Reporting Systems  
To achieve these goals, TSC first developed a framework, the Sustainability Measurement and 
Reporting Systems (SMRS), to define for any particular product category what product 
manufacturers should measure, how to measure it, and how to report it to a common database. 
As initially conceived, this process would create a market-typical baseline model that described 
the environmental impacts (e.g., CO2 emissions, water and energy use, waste) throughout the 
product life cycle for a particular product category (e.g., orange juice).
viii
 The baseline model 
would offer a starting point for comparing different products within the category (e.g., frozen 
orange juice); identifying the common high impact processes (“hot spots”) in production, 
distribution, and use phases; and, if data were available, quantifying the hot spot impacts. The 
next step would include validated product characteristics and processes that had been shown to 
improve performance. These validated tactics then would aid suppliers, retailers, and others in 
locating the highest impacts in product life cycles; if the data were available, they also could 
differentiate products from the baseline model. According to Johnson: 
Taking into account the baseline carbon emissions associated with market-typical 
orange juice, a supplier could identify one or more performance drivers that 
reduce carbon, such as a different nutrient management plan known to reduce 
carbon emission in the orange grove. The supplier might also be able to act on 
other performance drivers in different high impact stages of the life cycle which 
would reduce carbon emissions. Then the company (or its customer) can compare 
their orange juice with the market-typical orange juice on the dimension of carbon 
emissions and see if there are real improvement opportunities. This process could 
be repeated for water, waste, or other environmental dimensions. 
To discern the feasibility of these baseline models, through the winter of 2011 the Consortium 
focused on seven prototype product category baseline models in depth (orange juice, laundry 
detergent, laptops, wheat cereal, strawberry yogurt, televisions, and personal cleaners). The 
outcomes of this process would be leveraged into either an expansion of the baseline models or 
the pursuit of an alternative model. Johnson reflected on the issues:  
We expected in the beginning that a full, LCA [life cycle assessment]–based 
methodology for all products and all dimensions was going to be quite difficult to 
achieve in the near term, but we didn’t know how far we could get with it. Many 
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experts told us any kind of LCA-based approach would be impossible, while 
others were saying that it was ready to go out of the box. Rather than engage in an 
endless discussion among the academics, NGOs, and corporates, we decided to 
just try to build an LCA-based system and see for ourselves what was possible, 
what was impossible in the near term, what was impossible in principle, and how 
we could adapt the systems to generate something usable in the short term and 
aspirational in the long term.  
Progress on the prototypes turned out to be painstakingly slow, particularly because the data that 
was needed to develop a baseline for a product’s full life cycle was difficult to collect, and 
because not all of TSC members were completely aligned with the strategy. As of the winter of 
2011, some members, as well as representatives of the press and the environmental community, 
noted genuine concerns about the Consortium’s pace in developing new product standards.  
The Consortium faced issues of credibility, beyond these speed to market concerns. Other 
organizations were interested in providing similar services and were developing competing 
frameworks. The Sustainable Apparel Coalition, formed at about the same time as TSC, 
represented a multistakeholder effort to reduce the environmental and social impacts of footwear 
and apparel. Underwriter’s Laboratories had made significant investments in helping companies 
assess the sustainability of their products, and these efforts had considerable overlap with TSC 
work. The Consortium also wished to be recognized by the consumer goods industry as the 
primary industry source for standards development. To achieve this credibility, support from the 
Consumer Goods Forum was critical, because the global industry group, with more than 400 
members (dominated by retailers, manufacturers, and service providers), had substantial 
influence in the consumer goods industry. But the Consumer Goods Forum already was 
discussing frameworks similar to the new ideas emerging from TSC. 
Then in the spring of 2011, the Consortium undertook an evaluation of its progress on the 
prototypes, in which it considered both stakeholder feedback and the framework developed by 
the Consumer Goods Forum. In response, TSC modified its original sustainability reporting 
framework, in an effort to move more quickly across a broader range of products. In particular, 
TSC ended its initial experimental effort to address the full life cycle analysis (LCA) impacts of 
a few products and decided instead to move more quickly to develop a simplified reporting 
format for environmental impacts.  
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To implement this new strategy, it initiated the SMRS using designated “Level 1” and “Level 2” 
stages. The Level 1 stage would produce a common platform for companies to share category-
based environmental performance data and outcomes, on the basis of their hot spot analyses, 
improvement opportunities, and stakeholder concerns. A hot spot was defined as “a unit process 
or phase of a product life cycle that has a potentially significant environmental or social 
impact.”
ix
 The improvement opportunities entailed known best practices that could be employed 
by producers and manufacturers to address hot spots. Stakeholder concerns referred to those 
issues associated with the product category that important stakeholder groups (e.g., 
environmental NGOs) had raised but for which insufficient scientific evidence existed to make a 
definitive claim. They were included in the Level 1 SMRS because such issues frequently garner 
considerable public attention—sometimes even more so than important issues with a stronger 
scientific basis—and thus business decision makers must recognize and understand them.  
To identify hot spots and improvement opportunities, TSC and its members could undertake an 
intensive scientific analysis of a product’s impact across its life cycle, or they might review 
published literature and experts’ opinions, especially if relevant data are lacking or product 
systems are particularly complex (e.g., biodiversity losses due to fisheries depletion). To achieve 
greater speed and scope, the Consortium chose to rely initially on published reports, expert 
opinion, and industry agreement to identify environmental challenges and opportunities, rather 
than engage in the original LCA and reporting, which would have taken more time and required 
greater resources and capabilities. Finally, the outcomes of the Level 1 sustainability reporting 
were designed to guide business-to-business (B2B) conversations, serve as the foundation for 
supply chain initiatives, and evaluate producers at the product category level. 
In Level 2 sustainability reporting, to follow after the Level 1 goals were accomplished, TSC 
hoped to enable more specific, validated product declarations and B2B communication. It would 
deploy formal international standards, based on the ISO 14000 series, and provide category-level 
data to enable firms to differentiate their products from a baseline, in support of their formal 
product declarations.
x
 The Consortium also would provide companies with information that they 
could use to understand and share information in the first stage (Level 1), then differentiate and 
declare their products in the second (Level II). (Exhibit 3 offers a visual representation of the 
different stages and the Level 1 hot spot model outcomes.) 
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The Level 1 reporting system would rely on a structured, wiki-style knowledge base comprising 
several interrelated components for each product category:  
 Category Dossiers. These collections of evidence would pertain to the category’s supply 
chain, environmental and social hotspots, improvement opportunities, and stakeholder 
concerns. They would include extensive compilations of literature reviews, summaries of 
expert panel interviews, and other evidence-based information related to the 
sustainability impacts of a product category. Dossiers were open to continuous 
commenting and revision and intended for a technical audience. 
 Category Sustainability Profiles. Syntheses of product sustainability knowledge and 
improvement opportunities, the CSPs would offer two-page summaries of the 
information in the dossiers, with essential information about the product category’s hot 
spots, improvement opportunities, and stakeholder concerns. The CSPs would be 
published periodically—once or twice a year—and were developed for use by 
nontechnical business decision makers.  
 Key Performance Indicators. Featuring key metrics and questions about product category 
sustainability, the KPIs were associated with the corresponding CSPs and similarly 
grounded in the information contained in the dossiers. They were published on the same 
schedule as the CSPs. Retailers and other actors could use these KPIs to evaluate the 
sustainability performance of their suppliers at the product category level. 
Together, dossiers, CSPs, and KPIs represented an information generation and reporting system 
that member companies could use to standardize their communications about sustainability. A 
TSC Industry Reporting Platform was planned to be piloted in late 2012; with it, companies 
could provide information on key dimensions, as required by buyers throughout the consumer 
goods industry. The hope was that this innovation would obviate the need for organization-
specific scorecards and reporting platforms. 
Walmart’s Implementation of the Index 
Walmart piloted the consortium hot spot analysis in 10 product categories (e.g., cereal, coffee, 
apparel, hardware, electronics, toys) and thus created category-based “Live Better Scorecards.” 
(See Exhibit 4.) The scorecards allowed buyers to evaluate and compare supplier performance on 
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the most prominent issues and opportunities in a product category. By August 2012, Walmart 
had implemented scorecards in more than 100 categories, reaching roughly 135 buyers in its U.S. 
and Canadian Sam’s Club and Walmart businesses. Improvements in TSC’s category 
identification and Level 1 SMRS methodologies then expanded the list of categories covered; 
Walmart anticipates that scorecards will be available for 60% of its U.S. sales volume by the end 
of 2013. According to Jeff Rice, Director of Sustainability, the significance of the 
implementation has been immense:  
To make sustainability a part of Walmart’s core business, we had to build 
sustainability into the way we buy and sell merchandise. As we roll out the Index 
in these initial 107 categories, and as we expand implementation of the Index 
across our buying organization in 2013, we are building sustainability into the 
decision making for one of the largest procurement organizations in the world. 
The suppliers who work on this with us will be the suppliers that grow with us 
and will become stronger, more profitable businesses that significantly reduce the 
impact the consumer goods economy has on our resources and environment. 
A new Sustainability Value Network (SVN) also helps buyers implement the scorecards. When 
buyers adopt the scorecards, sustainability dimensions get added to their annual performance 
evaluation criteria. The process will be part of Walmart’s Joint Business Planning process in 
2013, including incentives and recognition for leading suppliers.
xi
 Rice thus noted the potential 
impact on suppliers: 
We’ll see some shifts in terms of sustainability. The radical shift is in how we talk 
to suppliers about it. We’re at a really interesting point in history, where 
sustainability is going to impact being a supplier to Walmart.… Our goal is to 
improve the sustainability our suppliers and the products our customers love, so 
we will recognize leading suppliers both internally and externally, and we’ll 
identify who needs to improve and work with them to get better.
xii
 
However, communicating sustainability information to consumers remained a long-term goal 
that would not be implemented anytime soon.
xiii
 Efforts were ongoing in other areas, such as 
nutrition, where a “Great for You” label that relied on the well-developed field of nutritional 
science was applied on some private-label food products. 
Other Sustainable Product Initiatives 
In the three years since Mike Duke’s announcement of the index, other company initiatives also 
aimed to create more sustainable products; the most significant were announced at the October 
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10, 2010, Sustainability Milestone Meeting. They focused on sustainable agriculture, attempting 
to increase locally sourced food, reduce food waste, provide related training to 1 million farmers, 
increase opportunities for women, eliminate Brazilian-sourced beef that was contributing to 
Amazon deforestation, and require all private-label products to incorporate sustainably sourced 
palm oil by 2015. (See Exhibit 5 for excerpts from this press release.) 
Stakeholder Reactions 
Initially, there was notable skepticism in the business and NGO communities. In 2009, the NGO 
community generally took a “wait and see” approach, and only the most proactive and pro-
business NGOs engaged in TSC. Others expressed more serious doubts about the credibility of 
the enterprise: GreenBiz CEO Joel Makover was “concerned about the optics of it all: the 
perception that major manufacturers are helping to create the methodologies or otherwise set the 
rules of rating products, presumably to their advantage.”
xiv
 He also worried about the 
“amorphous” nature of the goals set by TSC, which did not seem to offer a value proposition for 
involvement by other companies—especially if they had to pay the stiff membership dues. 
Nonetheless, major companies including the retail giants Kroger, Tesco, Royal Ahold, Best Buy, 
and Marks & Spencer had signed on to the Consortium. A 2011 Fortune article reported on both 
the slow progress and the extreme complexity of the task at hand, such that even some 
environmental groups were suggesting alternative, simpler approaches: “digging deeply into 
supply chains is so difficult, in fact, that even some environmental groups don’t have much hope 
that a sustainability index will push firms to invest in the staffing and expense it requires.”
xv
 A 
March 2012 report by the nonprofit Institute for Local Self-Reliance also accused Walmart of 
greenwashing in its efforts to institute the index.
xvi
 
Next Steps for Walmart and the Sustainability Consortium 
At the April 18, 2012, Sustainability Milestone Meeting at Walmart’s corporate offices in 
Bentonville, Arkansas, Board Chair Rob Walton addressed the meeting participants via video 
chat, to remind them of the importance of sustainability to Walmart’s future. He rhetorically 
asked the group how his father, Sam Walton, would have felt about Walmart’s sustainability 
journey. He provided his own answer: “No one would have been prouder, and no one would 
have asked harder questions.” Laying out the business case, he challenged: “I want to ask you to 
redouble your efforts. Put sustainability even deeper into every part of the business so that every 
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associate drives progress. Scale up and speed up on projects on waste, energy, agriculture, and 
the sustainability index.”
xvii
 His summary emphasis on the index was not accidental. Much of the 
remainder of the meeting focused on selling more sustainable products and doing it more 
quickly. CEO Mike Duke repeatedly reminded the group that he expected an acceleration of both 
effort and outcomes. Then Bill Simon, President and CEO of Walmart U.S., noted in relation to 
the index, “we’ve really got to figure that out; it’s been more difficult to get in place than what 
we would have imagined when we started.”  
Indeed. Only days before, at the Fortune Brainstorm Green conference, Rob Walton was on a 
panel with the magazine’s managing editor, in which he explained, “The sustainability index, 
one of the questions was about it not going fast enough. But good gosh, this is really complicated 
stuff. And, it’s giving our buyers information to inform decisions and compare products. It will 
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Exhibit 2: Consortium Membership Application, July 2012 
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Exhibit 3: Consortium Implementation Strategy and Level 1 Outputs 
 
 
Source: Coutesy of the Sustainability Consortium, July 2012. 
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Exhibit 4: Live Better Scorecard 
 
Source: Courtesy of Walmart, presented at the April 18, 2012 Sustainability Milestone Meeting. 
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Exhibit 5: Excerpts from Sustainable Agriculture Press Release
xx
  
BENTONVILLE, Ark., Oct. 14, 2010—Walmart today launched its new global commitment to sustainable agriculture that will 
help small and medium sized farmers expand their businesses, get more income for their products, and reduce the environmental 
impact of farming, while strengthening local economies and providing customers around the world with long-term access to 
affordable, high-quality, fresh food. 
“More than 1 billion people around the world rely on farming and hundreds of millions of them live on less than $2 a day,” said 
Mike Duke, Walmart president and CEO. “Globally, with a booming population, food production must increase roughly 70 
percent to feed 9 billion people in 2050.” 
Duke continued, “Through sustainable agriculture, Walmart is uniquely positioned to make a positive difference in food 
production—for farmers, communities and customers. Our efforts will help increase farmer incomes, lead to more efficient use of 
pesticides, fertilizer and water, and provide fresher produce for our customers.” 
Walmart’s sustainable agriculture strategy is divided into three broad areas, each containing specific supporting goals to help the 
company track and report its progress. 
Support farmers and their communities 
More than a billion people rely on agriculture for subsistence. By the end of 2015 in emerging markets, Walmart will help many 
small and mid-sized farmers gain access to markets by: 
 selling $1 billion in food sourced from 1 million small and medium farmers; 
 providing training to 1 million farmers and farm workers in such areas as crop selection and sustainable farming 
practices -- the company expects half of those trained to be women; and 
 increasing the income of the small and medium farmers it sources from by 10 to 15 percent. 
 In the U.S., Walmart will double its sale of locally sourced produce and increase its purchase of select U.S. crops. 
Produce more food with fewer resources and less waste 
Walmart has one of the world’s largest food supply chains and is committed to reducing and optimizing the resources required to 
produce that food and driving more transparency into its supply chain. For the first time Walmart will ask suppliers about the 
water, energy, fertilizer and pesticide they use per unit of food produced. The goals include: 
 accelerating the agricultural focus of the Sustainability Index, beginning with a Sustainable Produce Assessment for 
top producers in its Global Food Sourcing network in 2011; 
 investing more than $1 billion in its global fresh supply chain in the next five years; and, 
 reducing food waste in its emerging market stores and clubs by 15 percent and by 10 percent in stores and clubs in its 
other markets by the end of 2015. 
Sustainably source key agriculture products 
Farming practices are having unintended side effects, from deforestation of the world’s rainforests to increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Walmart will focus on two of the major contributors to global deforestation, palm oil and beef production. 
 Require sustainably sourced palm oil for all Walmart private brand products globally by the end of 2015. Sourcing 
sustainable palm oil for our U.K. and U.S. private brand products alone will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5 
million metric tons by the end of 2015. 
 Expand the already existing practice of Walmart Brazil of only sourcing beef that does not contribute to the 
deforestation of the Amazon rainforest to all of our companies worldwide by the end of 2015. It is estimated that 60 
percent of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is related to cattle ranching expansion. 
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